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Semiconductor avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are commonly used for single photon detection in quantum
key distribution. Recently, many attacks using bright illumination have been proposed to manipulate gated
InGaAs APDs. In order to devise effective counter-measures, careful analysis of these attacks must be carried
out to distinguish between incorrect operation and genuine loopholes. Here, we show that correctly-operated,
gated APDs are immune to continuous-wave illumination attacks, while monitoring the photocurrent for
anomalously high values is a straightforward counter-measure against attacks using temporally tailored light.
PACS numbers: 85.60.Gz Photo detectors; 85.60.Gw Photodiodes;
As a solution to the key distribution problem, quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) has attracted a great deal of
interest, because its underlying security is not reliant on
any assumptions about an eavesdropper’s (Eve’s) power.
Although QKD protocols can be proven to be perfectly
secure, the differences between a theoretical protocol and
its real-world implementation should be carefully ana-
lyzed. This helps expose weakness of specific implemen-
tations, and thus effective counter-measures can be de-
vised. One example of this is the decoy protocol,1–3 which
not only defeats the photon number splitting attack4,5
but also allows weak laser systems to achieve the highest
key rates.6,7
Scrutinizing the security of QKD systems using
avalanche photodiodes (APDs) is important, because
they are widely used.6–9 Recently, Lyderson et al.10
used two research QKD systems to demonstrate that
continuous-wave (CW) illumination can blind InGaAs
APDs so that the count rate falls to zero exactly. Un-
der such induced blindness, Eve can gain full information
about the secret key in a modified intercept-resend attack
with strong resent pulses. This blinding attack would be
a concern for practical QKD systems if proven univer-
sally effective. Fortunately, a later experiment showed
that the blinding attack is ineffective for APDs that are
operated correctly.11
In addition to the original blinding attack, Lydersen
et al. have also proposed a broader range of illumina-
tion attacks targeting gated detectors, including ther-
mal blinding, thermal blinding of frames, and “sink-
hole” attacks.12 These attacks need to be carefully an-
alyzed. In particular, efforts must be made to distin-
guish between incorrect operation and genuine loopholes,
only after which counter-measures can be effectively con-
structed. Here, we study the behavior of gated InGaAs
APDs under illumination ranging from 1 fW to >10 mW.
Careful analysis reveals that their gain modulation nat-
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urally fends off CW bright illumination attacks, with-
out resorting to further countermeasures. Photocurrent
monitoring is effective to foil more sophisticated attacks
involving temporally tailored illumination.
Figure 1(a) shows a typical circuit for a gated APD.
The biasing resistor (Rbias) is redundant, included here
only for illustrating the blinding attack.10 A voltage pulse
is used to raise the APD bias (Vg) above its break-
down voltage (Vb) [Fig. 1(b)]. Under such excessive bias
(Vex = Vg − Vb > 0), an APD can probabilistically mul-
tiply a single-photon induced charge into a macroscopic
current. A detection event is registered when the voltage
drop across the sensing resistor (Rs) exceeds the discrim-
ination level (L), as illustrated in Fig. 1(c). It is common
and good practice to set L as low as possible, determined
here by the capacitive response. A much lower L can be
achieved when the capacitive signal is removed.13–16
The APDs used here have absolute maximum ratings
of 3 mW for optical illumination and 5 mA for reverse
current. However, to investigate fully bright illumina-
tion of APDs, we exceeded these ratings by manyfold,
which inevitably caused damage to the APDs. As a re-
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FIG. 1. (a) A schematic diagram for gated mode operation;
(b) APD gating; (c) APD output waveforms showing capac-
itive responses and a single photon-induced avalanche. L:
discrimination level.
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FIG. 2. Measured (symbols) and simulated count rates and
photocurrent vs. incident optical power for (a) Rbias =
100 kΩ and (b) Rbias = 0.
sult, two APDs were used to complete this study. Unless
explicitly stated, the data shown in this paper refer to
APD1. We adopt the same electrical setup as in our
QKD experiment.17 The DC voltage is set 1.5 V below
Vb. The gating pulse has 3.5 ns duration, 4 V ampli-
tude (Vex=2.5 V) and 2 MHz repetition rate. Electrically
cooled to –30◦C, both APDs were measured to have a
single photon detection efficiency of 11%; a value typical
for InGaAs detectors. A CW laser of 1550-nm is used to
illuminate the APD.
We first illustrate the detector blinding by use of a
redundant Rbias = 100 kΩ. Figure 2(a) shows the de-
pendencies of the count rate and photocurrent as a func-
tion of the illumination power. Both are found to have a
linear dependence for an optical power of 1 nW or less.
Further increasing the illumination intensity, the count
rate first saturates, then falls sharply to zero, and re-
mains at zero until it finally recovers abruptly to the sat-
urated rate. The transitions are measured at IB = 2.5
and IR = 26 µW for the count rate fall and recovery,
respectively. The APD can be blinded by illumination
at at any power within the zero-count gap, and then ma-
nipulated using short optical pulses.10
The zero-count gap in Fig. 2(a) is simply a conse-
quence of the high impedance bias resistor. Removing
Rbias causes the zero-count gap to disappear through-
out the optical power range completely, as shown in Fig.
2(b). Without such a gap, Eve cannot manipulate this
detector and hence the APD is secure. The count rate is
well simulated with
R = f0[(1 − e
−µη) + Pd − (1− e
−µη) · Pd)], (1)
where f0 is the gate repetition rate, µ the photon flux
within each detection gate, η the detection efficiency,
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FIG. 3. IB and IR as a function of Rbias.
and Pd is the dark count probability. In contrast, the
simulation for Rbias = 100 kΩ gives a higher count rate
than measured when approaching count rate saturation
around 1 nW, suggesting a decreasing photon detection
efficiency due to the APD bias reduction via the high
impedance resistor.
The zero-count gap in Fig. 2(a) is a result of the bright
illumination induced photocurrent causing a voltage drop
across Rbias and thus reducing the bias applied to the
APD. At IB = 2.5 µW, the photocurrent is measured as
19 µA, corresponding to a voltage drop of 1.9 V across the
Rbias. Although this voltage drop is smaller than Vex, it
is sufficient to prevent the avalanche from evolving above
the discrimination level.18 The count recovery at IR is
due to gain modulation, which is discussed later.
We stress that Rbias = 0 is not necessary to avoid the
zero-count gap. Figure 3 shows the Rbias dependence of
IB and IR. With decreasing Rbias, the zero-count gap
narrows, as IB increases more rapidly than IR. It is
determined that for Rbias ≤ 20 kΩ, no zero-count gap is
found: the APD behaves similar to the case of Rbias = 0
[Fig. 2(b)].
Setting an inappropriate discrimination level also leads
to the detrimental zero-count gap. To illustrate this,
we plot in Fig. 4 the AC amplitude of the APD out-
put as a function of illumination power for various values
of Rbias. As the illumination power increases, the AC
amplitude declines first, then varies slowly, and finally
recovers sharply. While all AC voltages are greater than
the capacitive signal, the amplitude minimum increases
with decreasing Rbias. For Rbias ≤ 5 kΩ, the minimum is
significantly greater than the capacitive signal with clear
discrimination from the capacitive signal, thus allowing
persistent counting. However, if we deliberately discrim-
inate at a level which is twice the capacitive signal, a
detrimental zero-count gap would emerge even for the
case of Rbias = 0.
The AC amplitudes shown in Fig. 4 are provided by
the photocurrent modulated by the APD gating. In
contrast to single photon detection, this gain modula-
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FIG. 4. Signal amplitudes by gain modulation as a function of
illumination power for varying Rbias. The data were obtained
from APD2.
tion signal becomes significant only with bright illumi-
nation. The sharp amplitude recovery at high powers
is due to the APD bias reaching to its punch-through
voltage, below which photon absorption does not pro-
duce a photocurrent.19 At this voltage, electrical gating
switches on/off the photocurrent, thus producing a large
pulsed current.
Gain modulation might be compensated by a sophis-
ticated Eve using temporally tailored illumination.12 In
this case, monitoring the photocurrent for anomalously
high values is a straightforward counter-measure. As
shown in Fig. 2, the photocurrent is proportional to the
count rate in the single photon regime (I < 1 nW). Such
a relation is also observed for high speed APDs.20,21 By
constantly monitoring the photocurrent, an anomalously
high measured photocurrent, i.e., exceeding the expected
photocurrent in the single photon regime, can be used
to foil any bright illumination attack. We stress that
this measure is effective universally for all APDs, includ-
ing the non-gated22 as well as high-speed gated.15,16,23
In comparison with the previous proposal using a sepa-
rate power-meter,22 the present solution does not need a
lossy beam splitter which will inevitably deteriorate the
bit rate and distance in QKD.
Before commenting on recent attacks, two measures for
safeguarding APDs are listed below:
1. Avoid a high impedance biasing resistor and use a
low discrimination level;
2. Monitor the photocurrent for anomalously high val-
ues.
Measure 1 is actually the very basic rule for correctly
operating a gated APD.11 Following this rule alone will
prevent CW bright illumination attacks.
Now, we discuss what has caused the vulnerability in
Clavis2, one of the two systems attacked by Lydersen
et al.
10 We choose this system for discussion simply be-
cause it has more experimental details12 available. While
APDs in Clavis2 have an adequate Rbias = 1 kΩ, their
discrimination levels were set at ∼80 mV, which is more
than twice the value needed for rejection of the capacitive
signal (35 mV).12 Using such high discrimination level,
induced blindness was then demonstrated at an illumi-
nation of 397 µW. Later, instead of correcting the dis-
crimination levels, Lydersen et al. removed the non-zero
Rbias to show the induced blindness once again at a much
higher power (∼10 mW).12 This time, the detector heat-
ing was suggested as the prime cause. In both cases, we
believe the induced blindness should have been avoided
if the discrimination levels were correctly set. No matter
whether the illumination causes APD bias reduction10
or device heating,12 gain modulation always exists and
should trigger a discrimination level that is correctly set.
In our tests on an APD detector from Clavis2’s manufac-
turer, we saw no evidence of an induced blindness for a
CW illumination of up to 14 mW.24 Nor did we see the
induced blindness for an illumination of up to 17.8 mW
on our own detector.11
Lydersen et al. also demonstrated an alternative ther-
mal attack using temporally tailored light.12 Attacking
the Clavis2, which transmits quantum signals in frames,
blinding illuminations are switched on only during the in-
tervals between QKD frames. First, this is not a stealth
attack. It gives itself away by causing extra photon clicks
outside QKD frames. Even if a QKD system ignores such
clicks, monitoring the photocurrent for anomalously high
value is sufficient to foil this attack. The attack still re-
quires an average optical power of 1.5 mW, the photocur-
rent of which will significantly exceeds the value expected
in the single photon counting regime.
As a more special attack targeting AC-coupled detec-
tors, “sink-hole” attack illuminates between gates, creat-
ing a photocurrent valley around each APD gate.12 As
AC coupling re-bases the ground level, the avalanche sig-
nal sitting in these valleys will be reduced below the dis-
crimination level, thereby preventing detection of single
photons. However, this attack still requires an illumina-
tion of around 200 µW, the photocurrent of which re-
mains easily detectable. Moreover, such sink-hole attack
is ineffective to detectors using DC coupling, in which
no capacitor is used to block the DC signal before the
discriminator.
Finally, we discuss the “after-gate” attack, in which
Eve exploits the intrinsic linear mode of APD be-
tween gates, facilitated by the excessively long modu-
lation gates or detection acceptance window in the QKD
setup.25 As detailed in Ref. [25], this attack induces high
levels of detector afterpulsing, and thus works only on
frame-based QKD systems with long intervals between
frames. This attack is ineffective on continuous-running
one-way systems, particularly the high speed ones.6,7
Moreover, for any QKD systems, either narrowing the
modulation gate duration or the detection acceptance
window will completely defuse this attack. Nowadays,
use of sub-nanosecond modulation pulses or acceptance
windows in QKD is not uncommon.6,7,9,26
4To conclude, correctly-operated, gated APDs are im-
mune to CW bright illumination attacks. For tempo-
rally tailored illumination, monitoring the photocurrent
for anomalously high values is a straightforward counter-
measure.
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